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ESSAY/BOOK REVIEW

Compromising Positions
By Laurence H. Tribe.'
New York, New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 1990. Pp.
ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES.

270. $19.95.

REVIEWED BY CHARLES

A.

REES

2

Debate. Dispute. Log jam. Turmoil. Struggle. Conflict. Irresistible force and immovable object. Scylla and Charybdis. Clash. Battle.

Combat. War.' That is how Laurence Tribe describes the abortion
dilemma - the life of the fetus versus the liberty of the pregnant
woman.

The clash between pro-life and pro-choice is both external and

4
internal. Externally, the battle rages in judicial and legislative pro-

ceedings, 5 political campaigns, 6 public debate, 7 and street confronta-

1. Tyler Professor of Constitutional Law, Harvard Law School.
2. J.D., 1970, Harvard University; Professor of Law, University of Baltimore
School of Law; Member, Maryland Bar.
3. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 3, 6, 7, 8, 27,
72, 239, 242 (1990).
4. Notably, in United States Supreme Court cases from Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973), recognizing the pregnant woman's right of privacy in making the
abortion decision, to Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989),
upholding some state regulations of abortion. TRIBE, supra note 3, at 10-26.
5. Continuing legislative struggles have centered on restrictions on abortion,
such as consent requirements, notification provisions, waiting periods, "need" reviews, medical requirements, TRBE, supra note 3, at 197-205, 207, and the use of
public funds or facilities for abortions, id. at 151-59, 180-83, 206-07. Abortion has
also been a focus of legislative hearings regarding confirmation of judicial nominees,
e.g., Robert Bork for the Supreme Court, id. at 168-70.
6. Abortion as a "single issue" for voters was first seized by pro-life adherents,
id. at 147-50, and then by pro-choice supporters, id. at 179-80, 185-91.
7. Advocates of the pro-life position have included the leadership of the
Roman Catholic Church, id. at 31-32, 47-49, 143-47, and the National Right to Life
Committee, id. at 50, 137, 146, 177, 187. Advocates of the pro-choice position have
included National Organization for Women, id. at 45, 178, 187, National Abortion
Rights Action League, id. at 46, 142, 173-76, 178-79, 187-88, and Planned Parenthood, id. at 46, 142, 178.
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tions.8 Internally, each one of us, pro-life or pro-choice, is likely also
to feel the tug of the opposing side. 9
This review examines Tribe's book, particularly his discussion of
possible compromises to the abortion dilemma and his own apparent
resolution of the issue. This review then evaluates Tribe's work,
praising it in some respects and criticizing it in others, particularly,
for failing to propose any new compromises. Finally, this review
considers other possible compromises to the abortion dilemma which
are suggested by the United States Constitution (Tribe's specialty).

I.

THE BOOK

Tribe provides a scholarly description of abortion in American
history, 0 of the Supreme Court's decisions on abortion," and of
resulting political controversies.' 2 He explores the attitudes of other
cultures to abortion.13 He offers a spirited defense of the 1973 decision
of Roe v. Wade, 4 the Supreme Court's first and most important
abortion rights decision.
Tribe sees abortion rights at a crossroads, 6 because of changes
in the make-up of the Supreme Court. 7 By the time of the 1989
decision of Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 8 the 7-2 Supreme Court majority, supporting abortion rights in Roe, was reduced
to four justices. 9 Four other justices were, apparently, prepared to
overrule Roe. 20 Leaving Justice O'Connor, who has decided abortion
rights on a "case-by-case" basis. 2' In Webster those four justices,
8. Id. at 171-72. The most dramatic demonstrations have been those of

Operation Rescue. Id.
9. Id. at 229.
10. Id. at 27-51.
11. Id. at 10-26.
12. Id. at 139-96.
13. Id. at 52-76.

14. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

supra note 3, at 77-138.
16. Id. at 6.
17. Id. at 22-24, 173.
18. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
19. Id. The four justices were Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall, Justice
Blackmun, and Justice Stevens. Since 1989, the Supreme Court majority supporting
Roe has further been affected by the retirements of Justice Brennan in 1990 and
Justice Marshall in 1991.
20. TRIE, supra note 3, at 22-23, 173.
21. Id.
15. TRIE,
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with Justice O'Connor concurring, eroded Roe by somewhat expand22
ing state power to restrict abortion rights.
A.

POSSIBLE COMPROMISES TO THE ABORTION DILEMMA

At the crossroads, Tribe looks for signposts - compromises to
the abortion dilemma. First, pre-Roe state abortion reform legislation, 23 based on the American Law Institute (ALI) Model Penal Code
revision of 1959,2 allowed abortion where continued pregnancy would
greatly impair the physical or mental health of the female, where the
fetus was likely to be born with grave physical or mental defects, or
25
where the pregnancy resulted from rape or incest. However, Tribe
26
sees the state abortion reform movement as slow and uncertain, with
laws being restrictive, rather than permissive,
many state "reform"
27
rights.
of abortion
2
Second, Roe itself was a compromise 1 which made legal and safe
abortions generally available to women, but which permitted states to
regulate abortion - by requiring physicians performing abortions to
be licensed, even in the first three months (trimester) of pregnancy;
by requiring that abortions only be performed in ways designed to
protect the pregnant woman's health, beginning in the second trimester; and by prohibiting abortion (in order to protect fetal life) in the
third trimester (after viability), unless the abortion was necessary to
29
protect the pregnant woman's life or health. While Tribe accepts the
3°
Roe compromise as a fair, logical, and generally popular way to
harmonize the conflicting interests of the pregnant woman's liberty
3
and the fetus's life, he recognizes that Roe is in danger. '
Third, since Roe, a variety of legislative compromises have been
proposed and, in some cases, enacted - requiring that the pregnant
female obtain the consent of the putative father or of her own parents,
32
if she is a minor, before an abortion; requiring that the pregnant
22. Webster v. Reprod. Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490, 498-513 (1989). TRIBE,
supra note 3, at 6, 24, 25, 177, 197.
23. Id. at 49.
24. See id. at 36, 42.
25. Id. at 36, 42.
26. Id. at 49-51.
27. Id. at 42, 49-51.
28. Id. at 78, 197.
29. Id. at 11-12, 78-79.
30. See id. at 136, 138; see also id. at 193, 230. But cf. id. at 143-72 (pro-life
reaction to Roe).
31. See supra notes 16-22 and accompanying text.
32. TMuE, supra note 3, at 198-99.
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female notify her parents, if she is a minor, before an abortion; 33
requiring a waiting period before an abortion; 34 listing the reasons for
which abortion will be allowed, either by outlawing abortions for
certain reasons, such as sex selection, or by permitting abortions only
for certain reasons, such as those specified in the ALl proposal; 35

restricting public funding of abortions;3 6 regulating abortion clinics
and their procedures; 37 establishing an earlier cut-off date, somewhere
between 4 to 14 weeks from conception, before which abortions are

generally available and after which they are generally unavailable. 31
Tribe sees these proposals as "cruel compromises," which usually do

not serve their stated purposes and which frustrate, instead of promote, either fetal life or female liberty. 39
Fourth, the issue of abortion could be left to the states by looking
to the original intent of the framers of the fourteenth amendment, 40
by constitutional amendment, 4' or as a practical result of the Webster
decision in 1989.42 However, Tribe believes that the abortion dilemma
generally should be resolved at the national level with the rights of
the pregnant woman and the interests of the fetus left as Roe
prescribed them. 43 Tribe is critical of the original intent argument,"

doubtful that the pro-life side could muster the super-majorities
necessary for a constitutional amendment, 45 and adamant that Roe
33. Id. at 199-203.
34. Id. at 203-04.
35. Id. at 204-05. The ALl proposal is described above. See supra text accompanying notes 24-25.
36. TRIBE, supra note 3, at 206-07.
37. Id. at 207.
38. Id. at 208.
39. Id. at 208-10.
40. See id. at 106. See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 117 (1973) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
41. See TRIBE, supra note 3, at 162-63 (proposed Hatch Human Life Federalism
Amendment); see also id. at 148-49.
42. Id. at 24, 177, 197.
43. Id.at 80-82, 126, 197. Roe established a right to abortion under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, see id. at 80-81, rejected the idea that
the term "person" in the Due Process Clause includes a fetus, id. at 115, but left to
the states to decide what restrictions to put on abortion after viability (except on
abortions for protecting the life or health of the pregnant female), id. at 197; cf. id.
at 16, 154 (under Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (holding states may decide
whether to fund abortions)).
44. TRIBE, supra note 3, at 106-08.
45. Id. at 164-65. Indeed, an amendment was criticized by those in the pro-life
camp who wanted to outlaw abortion outright, not leave it to the states to decide.
Id. at 163.
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should not be overruled,46 particularly where the local option could
be exercised in "cruel compromises. "147
Fifth, the "consensus" of Western European countries' laws is
that fetal life is respected, subject to exceptions, which are limited in
law but broad in fact. However, Tribe sees the European compromise
as hypocritical, as undermining the rule of law, and as troublesome,
because the compromise permits the exercise of governmental discretion which may vary from state to state and which may discriminate
49
on the basis of class, race, or sex. Nonetheless, Tribe does endorse
European practices of improving education about and access to
contraception, to prevent unwanted pregnancies, and of providing
maternity and postnatal services and benefits, in order to make
childbirth more attractive.50
B.

TRIBE'S RESOLUTION TO THE ABORTION DILEMMA

Tribe looks in other directions for help in reaching an enduring
compromise to the abortion dilemma. First, he considers whether
technology can help. New and improved forms of contraception for
both males and females would prevent many unwanted pregnancies
and reduce the demand for abortions." However, contraception cannot eliminate the demand for abortions, because contraceptives are
not always available, people do not always choose to use them, and
52
they are not always effective. Also, women may choose abortion
because their fetuses have genetic or medical abnormalities or because
changes in the woman's circumstances may make additional children
undesirable." An "abortion pill," such as the French RU-486, would
54
eliminate the need for many surgical abortions, although it would
likely be opposed by those who are against abortion from the moment
of conception." Embryo transfers to surrogate mothers and artificial
wombs, if they could be developed, would be very costly, in terms of
money - recruiting and compensating surrogate mothers and devel46. Id. at 128-29, 194-95.
47. Id. at 197-210.

48. Id. at 71-73.

49. Id.at 73-76.

50. Id.at 72-73, 211-13.
51. Id. at 213-14.
52. Id. at 214.
53. Id.

54. Of course, an "abortion pill," like contraception, would not entirely
eliminate the demand for surgical abortions. Id.
55. Id. at 215. But cf. 122-24 (conception is a process, not a moment).
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oping artificial wombs and maintaining fetuses in them;56 in terms of
liberty - government intrusion into private decisions and government
disposition of unwanted fetuses and babies; 7 and in terms of family
values - separating fetuses from their natural mothers and placing
babies in foster care or in adoption.5 8 Thus, technology offers some
hope, but it is not a panacea.
Second, Tribe considers whether the ways we look at ourselves, at
the abortion problem, and at the debate between pro-life and prochoice could be improved. In looking at ourselves, Tribe says that we
should strive for humility, tolerance with for diversity of opinion, and
respect for others. 9 In looking at the abortion dilemma, he provides a
"dia-Tribe" against both sides of the debate - pro-life advocates must
confront the possibility that their position is based less on the protection
of unborn children (an "absolute" value) than on the subordination
of women6' (a value "contingent" upon a particular social context); 6'
pro-choice advocates must separate a woman's fundamental right not
to remain pregnant from what is not necessarily her right, to destroy
a fetus. 62 In looking at the debate between pro-life and pro-choice,
Tribe believes that we should reflect our devotion to democracy and to
equality by engaging in persuasion and dialogue 63 and by recognizing
the strengths of our opponents' arguments as well as the weaknesses
of our own,6 not by imposing our ideas on others. 65
Thus, Tribe's compromise to the abortion dilemma apparently
has four elements. First, he accepts Roe's recognition of both the
pregnant woman's liberty and the fetus's life and, perhaps, even the
particular balance between those interests struck in Roe. 6 Second,
Tribe wants to improve our education about, and our access to,
contraception in order to prevent unwanted pregnancies, and he wants
us to provide maternity and postnatal services and benefits, in order
56. Id. at 225-27. Tribe notes that 1,600,000 abortion are performed each year
in the United States. Id. at 227.
57. Id. at 222-25, 227, 230.
58. Id.at 227.
59. Id. at 239-41.
60. Women are subordinated by the imposition upon them of traditional sex
roles and by the enforcement against them of an unequal and harsh sexual morality.
Id. at 237.
61. Id. at 27, 237.
62. Id. at 223-25.
63. Id. at 239-41.
64. Id. at 8.
65. Id. at 241.
66. See id. at 6, 11-13, 78-79, 128-29, 135-38.
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to make childbirth more attractive. 6 7 Third, he grants that improved
technology, particularly the development of more effective contracep-6
abortion.
tion and an "abortion pill," may lessen the need for
about ourselves,
Fourth, Tribe wants us to reexamine our attitudes
69
it.
debate
we
way
the
and
problem,
the abortion
II.
A.

EVALUATION

PRAISE

In many respects Tribe's book is excellent. He sees that for most
deeply felt. 70
people the abortion dilemma is an internal one that is
His anthropology of abortion throughout the world traces abortion
policy back to its political, economic, religious, eugenic, and sexist
roots in many cultures. 7' His history of abortion in America separates
72
law into strands of religion, medicine, and sexism. His politics of
abortion since Roe gives a play-by-play description of pro-life and
pro-choice activity, private and governmental, refereed by the Suof historical74
preme Court. 73 He advances the argument that, because
and almost universal75 discrimination against women, abortion rights
76
should be based on the right to equal protection of the laws, as well
77
as on the right to privacy. He clearly describes the effects of
7
technology on the abortion dilemma, especially the chilling implications of artificial wombs - "a Brave New World of state-run baby
0
farms." ' 79 He outlines ways to improve the debate over abortion; in
particular, he exhorts pro-life advocates to promote life, not the
subordination of women, and he exhorts pro-choice advocates to
8
promote choice, not the destruction of fetuses. '
67. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.

68. See supra notes 51-59 and accompanying text.
69. See supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
70. TRIBE, supra note 3, at 229.
71. Id. at 52-76.
72. Id. at 27-51.
73. Id. at 10-26, 139-96.
74. See id. at 27-51.
75. See id. at 52-76.

76. Id.at 105, 135; see also id.at 141, 193-94, 196, 206, 212, 224, 238.
77. Id.at 77-112.
78. Id. at 213-27.
79. Id. at 227.

80. Id.at 239-41.
81. Id.at 223-25.
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CRITICISM

In other respects Tribe's book is lacking. First, it is not clear

that Tribe's purpose for writing the book is indeed to reach a

compromise to the abortion dilemma. He takes too many positions,
rather like Supreme Court justices in the "Pentagon Papers" case,
New York Times Co. v. United States, " where there were ten opinions
a per curiam plus one for each justice. Most of the time Tribe is
the scholar, seeking to understand and make understood to his readers
the two sides to the abortion debate and its context."3 At times he is
the public citizen, seeking to "get beyond" the debate in order to
restore harmony to our political life. 4 At other times he is the
mediator, trying to find common ground8 and common language persuasion and dialogue, not demand and force16 - to resolve the
debate between the two sides. At still other times Tribe is the advocate,
usually for the pro-choice side 7 (his majority position), but occasionally for the pro-life side88 (his minority position).
Second, it may be that Tribe's bias has kept him from fairly
evaluating the two sides to the abortion debate. His dedication to the
pro-choice side may keep him from clearly seeing the pro-life side,
rather like the Supreme Court majority's endorsement of the employer's right to contract in Lochner v. New York 9 kept it from fairly
82. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
83. E.g., TRIBE, supra note 3, at 8-9.
84. E.g., id. at 7, 242.
85. E.g., id. at 7-8.
86. See id. at 239-41.
87. Tribe's pro-choice bias has been widely noted. See Vada Berger, Book
Review, 25 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 625, 629 (1990); Michelle Condit, Within the
Confines of the Law: Abortion and a Substantive Rhetoric of Liberty, 38 BUFF. L.
REV. 903, 905 (1990) (Book Review); David DeWolf, Book Review, 26 GONZ. L.
REv. 257, 257 n.2, 258 (1990-91); Mary C. Dunlap, Mediating the Abortion Controversy: A Callfor One-Sided Etiquette While the Bombs Keep Flying?, 30 WASHBURN
L.J. 41, 48 n.30 (1990) (Book Review); Pat Goodson, A Profile Perspective, 30
WASHBURN L.J. 68, 69 (1990) (Book Review); Joan Mahoney, The Continuing Clash,
59 U. CIN. L. REV. 1231, 1232, 1234, 1239 (1991) (Book Review); Isabel Marcus,
Many Realities, Many Words: Abortion and the Struggle Over Meaning, 69 TEX. L.
REV. 1259, 1262 (1991) (Book Review); Michael W. McConnell, How Not To Promote
Serious DeliberationAbout Abortion, 58 U. Cm. L. REv. 1181, 1183-85 (1991) (Book
Review); David M. Smolin, Why Abortion Rights are Not Justified by Reference to
Gender Equality: A Response to Professor Tribe, 23 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 621, 622
(1990) (Book Review); Maximilian B. Torres, Book Review, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
282, 283 n.3, 289-90 (1991). But cf. Erwin N. Griswold, Thorough Careful and Fair,
HARv. L. BULL., 29, 30 (Summer 1990) (Book Review).
88. See infra notes 98, 109-14, 138-43, 153-54, 158 and accompanying text.
89. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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assessing the interests of employees, their families, and the public in
limiting working hours.
Often, Tribe's tone seems to tilt to pro-choice - he treats women
9
seeking abortions sympathetically, 0 while treating fetuses being aborted
dispassionately. 91 Also, Tribe usually portrays pro-choice advocates3
portraying pro-life advocates unsympathetically,
heroically, 92 while 94
or even as villains.
Tribe's use of facts seems to favor pro-choice. Remarkably, he
uses the statistic, that 1,600,000 abortions are now performed
95
annually in the United States, not as an argument against abor96 but as an argument for abortion - if abortion were not
tion,
readily available, the number of unwanted children would increase
97

on a massive scale.
Tribe's treatment of the rights of persons affected by abortion
does not seem even-handed. While his "picture"

of the abortion

dilemma includes the fetus (at least in its later stages of develop-

98
ment), as well as the pregnant woman, his picture does not include

anyone else. Regarding the abortion rights of women, Tribe devotes99
one chapter to the inclusion of abortion in the right to privacy,
he scatters references to the inclusion of abortion in the right to
equal protection, m°° and he briefly touches on the inclusion of
abortion in several other rights,' 0 ' speculating that abortion is
02
and suggesting that
protected by the Just Compensation Clause'
' 3 or by "natural law.' 0 4
rights"'
abortion is supported by "vested

90. E.g., TRIBE, supra note 3, at 40, 103-04, 203.
91. E.g., id. at 50, 141. But see id. at 116-20.
92. E.g., id. at 47-49, 134-35, 165-67. But see id. at 178.
93. E.g., id. at 143-47, 157, 183-84.
94. Id. at 167, 171-72, 237-38.
95. Id. at 227.
96. Cf. id. 141 (right-to-life advocates portray legalized abortion as governmentsponsored mass-killing, similar to the Holocaust).
97. Id. at 227.
98. Id. at 136-38.
99. Id. at 77-112.
100. Id. at 105, 135; see also id. at 141, 193-94, 196, 206, 212, 224, 238.
101. Cf. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERIcAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1354 (2d ed.
1988) (forced carrying, delivering, and nurturing a child may be involuntary servitude).
102. Government limitations on abortion may constitute "takings" for which
just compensation must be paid to a woman under the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution. Tribe credits Lloyd Cutler with the idea. Id. at 226.
103. The "vested rights" approach is suggested by Tribe's argument that a
Constitutionally-protected fundamental right, such as abortion, may be taken away
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While Tribe's reliance on the right to privacy is well-grounded in

Supreme Court authority'05 and his reliance on equal protection is

appealing,'°0 his invocation of the other rights goes well beyond the
07
support he offers.

only by Constitutional amendment, not by Supreme Court overruling or by act of
Congress. Id. at 80, 128-29, 162, 194-95.
104. The "natural law" approach is suggested by Tribe's argument that females,
no less than males, have a capacity for, id. at 135, and therefore a natural right to,
id. at 63, individual choice, independence, autonomy, and individualism, see id. at
135, which for females includes the right to abortion, see id. at 45, 52, 63, 113, 132,
135, 208.
105. Id. at 77-112.
106. Many commentators have noted our nation's history of sex discrimination.
E.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (Brennan, J., plurality).
However, Tribe does not address the following questions. Do limitations on abortion
discriminate against females, or only against one subclass within the class of females
- those who are pregnant and wish to abort? Cf. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484
(1974) (holding that state disability program, which did not pay benefits for pregnancy
and childbirth, did not violate equal protection). Are females, a statistical majority
of our population, see U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE

1990 12 (1990), more deserving than fetuses of special judicial
protection for "discrete and insular minorities"? See DAVID CRUMP, ET AL., CASES
AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 542 (1989). Don't limitations on abortion
UNITED STATES:

satisfy the intermediate judicial scrutiny used for gender discrimination cases substantially related to an important government objective? Cf. Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 162-65 (1973) (asserting that limitations on abortion in the third trimester
generally satisfy strict judicial scrutiny).
107. Regarding Cutler's Just Compensation Clause argument, supra note 102,
Tribe notes that just compensation is due only when property, not liberty, is taken.
Of course, if it were otherwise, government might have to compensate a parent for
supporting a child after birth, as well as compensate citizens for a variety of civic
duties, such as military service and calls to appear in court or before other government
agencies. Also, Tribe does not address the following questions: Are government
limitations on abortions "takings" for which compensation is due, or "police power"
regulations for which no compensation is due? Is any taking for a "public use," or
for the private use of the fetus? Is a child a benefit to the mother offsetting the value
of any taking? If sexual intercourse was voluntary, has the woman waived any right
to compensation? If sexual intercourse was involuntary, isn't the woman's remedy
against the man who impregnated her? Similarly, wouldn't the government's inaction,
in failing to limit abortions, constitute a taking of the life of the fetus for which just
compensation would have to be paid to its survivors? (Tribe assumes that state
inaction may constitute state action in the abortion context. If the fetus were
considered a "person," Tribe writes that the failure of the state to limit abortion
would license others to deprive the fetus of life without due process and would deny
the fetus equal protection of the state's murder laws. TRIBE, supra note 3, at 115.)
Regarding the "vested rights" approach, Tribe does not address the following
questions. Is the abortion right, nowhere explicitly mentioned in the Constitution,
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Regarding the interest of fetuses, Tribe devotes one chapter to
rejecting ideas that the fetus is a "person" and that the fetus' status
as a person would matter, 0 8 and then he scatters references to the
9
fetus' claim to protection after viability.'0 Tribe can find support for
protection of the fetus only in the state's interest of protecting
2
potential human life" ° and in morality,"' public opinion," and
4
intuition," 3 not otherwise in the Constitution." Thus, he may not go
5
far enough in justifying the fetus' claim for protection."
legitimately protected as a fundamental Constitutional right? See TRIBE, supra note
3, at 78-110; see also id. at 240-41; cf. id. at 7 (pro-life view that, since judges read
abortion rights into the Constitution, judges could read abortion rights back out).
What are the exact bounds of the abortion right? Id. at 80. How is that right to be
harmonized with other interests, such as the conflicting right of a fetus to life? Id.
at 98-99, 223-25; cf. id. at 96, 137 (even the First Amendment right of free speech
may be abridged by government for compelling reasons). If the Supreme Court may
properly overrule the freedom to contract, established by Lochner v. New York, id.
at 84-86, why may the Supreme Court not overrule the abortion right, established by
Roe v. Wade? If Congress, pursuant to its power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, may move ahead of the Supreme Court to protect the abortion right,
see TRIBE, supra note 3, at 191-92, why may Congress not move ahead of the Supreme
Court to protect the right of the fetus to life? Cf. id. at 162 (proposed Helms Human
Life Statute).
Regarding the "natural law" approach, Tribe does not address the following
questions: To what extent is "natural law" still a useful concept? See TRIBE, supra
note 3, at 84. To what extent are ideas about women's nature, see id. at 135, and
abortion not universal, but culture-specific, reflecting a particular time and place?
See id. at 76. Isn't childbirth more "natural" than abortion? See id. at 235; see also
id. at 237. How is any natural right to abortion to be harmonized with a natural
right of a fetus to life? See id. at 230; see also id. at 138.
108. Id. at 113-38.
109. Id. at 15, 98-99, 223-25; see also infra notes 112-14.
110. According to Roe v. Wade, the state's interest in potential human life
becomes compelling when the fetus becomes viable. Beginning with viability, the state
may regulate or even prohibit abortion, except when it is necessary to preserve the
life or health of the woman. 406 U.S. at 163; see also TRIBE, supra note 3, at 12.
111. See id. at 102, 120, 137, 138, 211, 223-25.
112. See id.at 120, 137-38, 224, 230.
113. See id. at 224, 230.
114. The state's interest in potential human life is, presumably, part of the
state's general police powers - the promotion of health, safety, morals, and welfare
- reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution.
115. Tribe does not address the following questions. Is support for protection
of the fetus - based on the state's interest in potential human life and on morality,
public opinion, and intuition - articulated sufficiently to constitute a "compelling
interest"? Cf. id. at 20, 126-27, 173, 175 (state declarations of human life beginning
at conception). Why should the state have an interest in protecting the fetus? If
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Regarding the rights of parents of minor pregnant females, Tribe
briefly discusses Supreme Court cases dealing with parental consent" 6
and parental notification legislation, , 17 but he shows little concern for
the rights of parents. Thus, when Tribe discusses two early cases,

Meyer v. Nebraska'"8 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters," 9 he discusses
them in the context of being ancestors of the right of privacy of
pregnant women to have abortions, 20 not in the context of giving
parents rights in child-rearing.l21

Regarding the rights of putative fathers of fetuses, Tribe summarily dismisses the idea of such rights, although he recognizes the
right to reproduce, citing Skinner v. Oklahoma,22 a case involving a

man's rights, and parental responsibilities of fathers after birth. 23
Interestingly, although Tribe recognizes that women have some right
to decide whether or not to become parents' 24 and whether or not to
permit use of their genetic material in the creation of other human
beings, 25 and although he recognizes that some distinctions between
the sexes implicate the Equal Protection Clause,1 26 he does not consider
the rights of men in those respects. Without discussion, Tribe states
that granting parents of minor pregnant females the rights of notice
or consent is "obviously different," presumably being more justified,
than giving the same rights to putative fathers of fetuses. 12 7

protection of the fetus is a compelling interest after viability, why isn't it compelling

enough to outweigh the preservation of the health, even if not the life, of the woman?
If protection of the fetus is a compelling interest after viability, why isn't it compelling
before viability? See id. at 22-23 (discussing Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv.,
492 U.S. 490 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality)). Should the fetus be entitled to an
independent claim of Constitutional rights, because of its gradual development from
a sperm and ovum at conception to a "person" at birth, or because it would develop
into a "person" but for a miscarriage (abortion)? See TRIBE, supra note 3, at 224.
To what Constitutional rights might a fetus be entitled? See id. at 1 (basic right to
life); see also supra note 107 (discrete and insular minority for equal protection
purposes). If the fetus has Constitutional rights, who may assert those rights for the
fetus, in light of its incapacity?
116. TRIBE, supra note 3, at 14.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 199-202.
262 U.S. 390 (1923).
268 U.S. 510 (1925).
TRIE, supra note 3, at 92-93, 99, 102-03.

121. See id. at 93, 108.

122. 316 U.S. 535 (1942), cited in

123. TRIBE, supra note 3, at 133.
124.
125.
126.
127.

See id. at 93, 114, 225.
See id. at 223-24.
See, e.g., id. at 133.

Id. at 198.

TRIBE,

supra note 3, at 93, 105, 233.
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Regarding the rights of other persons affected by abortion, Tribe
makes only passing reference to the interests of doctors and hospitals,'2 and none to the interests of putative siblings or putative
grandparents (other than those who are parents of minor pregnant
females). 29
By denying that a fetus is a "person" and by generally ignoring
the interests of persons 30 (other than the woman) affected by abortion,
3
Tribe largely avoids having to accommodate conflicting rights . '
Indeed, he believes that balancing the right of a fetus (if considered
a "person") to life against the right of a woman to life (if a pregnancy
was life-threatening) is probably not possible. 32 While balancing may
seem impossible in that context, there are other respects in which
balancing may be useful. Indeed, Roe v. Wade itself, balancing the
abortion rights of pregnant women against the interests of the state
in protecting potential life, concluded that, while abortion was to be
rather freely permitted before viability, abortion might be generally
prohibited after viability, except when necessary to preserve the life
or health of the woman. 33 Of course, by avoiding balancing, Tribe
does not consider whether the interests of the woman, the fetus, the
parents of a minor pregnant female, the husband or putative father,
34
and others on each side of the abortion issue may be aggregated.
Another way of accommodating conflicting rights is by narrow
tailoring. Tribe accepts (or at least does not reject) narrow tailoring
of the abortion right in the case of a viable fetus, where the attending
physician, or a second physician, may be required to preserve the
fetus' life, if that may be done without increased risk to the woman's
health. 35 Tribe notes that some states require that a pregnant female
give notice to or get the consent of her parents, or her husband or
the putative father before an abortion. 36 However, Tribe rejects these
requirements as not serving the purpose of decreasing the number of
128. Id. at 78, 145; ef. supra note 115 (interests of state government).
129. See supra notes 117-22 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 109-29 and accompanying text (these interests may be
regarded as fundamental rights).
131. But cf. TRIBE, supra note 3, at 98-99, 223-25 (the right not to remain
pregnant may be distinguished from the right to destroy one's fetus).
132. See id. at 122.
133. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
134. See Donald H. Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MIcH. L. REV. 1569,
1644 (1979).
135. TRIE, supra note 3, at 15; see also id. at 22.
136. Id. at 14, 198-203.
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abortions and as having unintended and bizarre consequences. 31 7 Tribe
appears to disapprove of abortion for certain reasons, e.g., to maintain the beauty of a woman's figure,' 38 for eugenics (at least when
abortion is forced by the government), 139 to provide fetal tissue for
medical experiments or as a source of transplants,' 40 for sex selection,' 4' for birth control, 42 or, perhaps, even to destroy the fetus. 143
However, he rejects the idea of limiting the reasons for which abortion
is allowed, because women generally do not have abortions for
frivolous reasons, because a limitation on reasons would just be used
as a way station to outlawing abortion altogether, and because
enforcement of abortion limitations would require an inquiry into the
reasons for abortion, which itself would be an invasion of privacy. ,44
Tribe's criticisms of the arguments of the two sides of the
abortion debate do not seem even-handed. Tribe is very critical of the
arguments of pro-life advocates. If they really believe that abortion
is murder, 45 he asks, why don't they seek punishment of the woman
and her physician as murderers?'46 If abortion is really the killing of
an innocent human being,' 47 he asks, why would pro-life advocates
generally permit abortion in cases of rape and incest 48 or where a
pregnancy threatens the life of the woman? 49 If pro-life advocates
are really against abortion, he asks, why aren't they willing to take
steps, such as providing birth control education and contraceptive
devices, to reduce pregnancies? 50 If they are really for life, he asks,
why aren't they willing to make childbirth more attractive by providing
maternity and family services?"' And why aren't pro-life advocates
willing to combat child abuse as energetically as they combat abor2
tion?'1
137. Id. at 209-10.

138. Id. at 55.
139. Id.at 111-12.
140. Id.at 133.

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. at 204-05.
Id.
See id.at 223-25.
Id. at 205.
E.g., id. at 16, 141, 143.
See id. at 121-22.
Id. at 232.
Id. at 231-34.
Id. at 121-22.
Id. at 234; see also id. at 72-73, 213.

151. Id at. 72-73.
152. Id.at 235-36.
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On the other hand, Tribe is not very critical of the arguments of
pro-choice advocates. He is only mildly critical of pro-choice advocates for seeing only one party, the pregnant woman, and not the
fetus in the abortion "picture."' 15 3 He offers only a mild reproach to
pro-choice advocates for failing to distinguish between a woman's
right not to remain pregnant and what is not necessarily her right, to
destroy the fetus. 15 Tribe does not ask, if pro-choice advocates are
really for choice, why their counselling does not stress sexual abstinence, as well as contraception; marriage and the family, as well as
abortion; and the value of life, as well as the value of choice.' Also,
leave for
Tribe does not ask pro-choice advocates what choice5 they
6
abortion.
by
affected
woman)
the
than
(other
persons
Tribe harbors deep suspicions about the motivations of one side,
but not the other. He is suspicious that pro-life advocates may be
motivated by the desire to impose on women traditional sex roles and
an unequal and harsh sexual morality.' However, he voices little
suspicion that women seeking abortions are motivated by the desire
to destroy their fetuses, not just to exercise their right not to remain
pregnant.""
Finally, Tribe's book may be criticized for what he seems to
admit is such a weak conclusion,5 9 rather like the empty promise of
"something beyond" in PrudentialInsurance Co. v. Benjamin.16° As
153. Id. at 137-38; cf. supra notes 117-30 and accompanying text (rights of other
persons affected by abortion).
154. Id. at 98, 223-25.
155. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 151-53 (Tribe's hypothetical questions
directed at pro-life advocates).
156. See supra text accompanying notes 110-30.
157. TRME, supra note 3, at 237-38.
158. See id. at 98, 223-25.
159. See id. at 7-9, 228-29, 241-42.
160. 328 U.S. 408, 425 (1946). There, the Supreme Court upheld the McCarran
Act of Congress, permitting state regulation and taxation of the business of insurance,
although the Court had held two years earlier in United States v. South-Eastern
Underwriters Assoc., 322 U.S. 533 (1944), that insurance was subject to federal
regulation, such as antitrust laws. Justice Rutledge, writing for the Court in Prudential, based his conclusion on "something beyond" institutional deference of the Court
to Congress. 328 U.S. at 425-26. However, in at least one commentator's view,
Justice Rutledge did not explain what that "something beyond" was. Noel T.
Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power - Revised Version, 47 COLUM. L.
Rv. 547, 557 (1947). Professor Dowling explained:
At this point it seemed almost as if Mr. Justice Rutledge were leading to a
mountain top from which he would point out the "something beyond"
which really went to the root of the matter. But after looking at this point
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we have seen, Tribe accepts Roe v. Wade, which is generally rejected
by pro-life advocates and which is in danger of being overruled by
the Supreme Court. 6' As we have also seen, Tribe rejects other
possible compromises - pre-Roe state abortion reform legislation,

post-Roe legislative compromises, local option, and the Western Eur-

opean consensus. 62 Tribe finds no Solomon-like solution 63 to the
abortion dilemma. Indeed, he summarily dismisses the suggestion that
the woman just wait until viability for the fetus to be surgically
removed, as a way of accommodating the life of the fetus and the
liberty of the woman.'" Beyond Roe, Tribe's compromise, as we have

and at that on the broad landscape of his opinion, I was still not sure that
my vision had caught the "something beyond."
Id. at 557; see also, GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 302-04 (12th ed. 1991).
My own view is that Justice Rutledge did offer "something beyond." He
developed, both before and after that phrase, in his opinion in Prudential, three
themes. One was precedent, that the trend of SupremeCourt decisions was to broaden
the scope of Congress' power under the Commerce Clause, 328 U.S. at 415 n.11,
420, to broaden the scope of state power notwithstanding the negative implication of
the Commerce Clause, 328 U.S. at 420 n.20, and to uphold acts of Congress
contradicting previous Court holdings that states, by negative implication, were
prohibited from regulating commerce, 328 U.S. at 424-25 n.29, 427, 433. Justice
Rutledge's second theme was that the Commerce Clause is a grant of power to
Congress, not a limitation on that power. 328 U.S. at 422-23, 434. Cf. McCulloch
v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 419-20 (1819) ("Necessary and Proper" Clause
enlarges, not diminishes, the powers of Congress). Subsequent cases have held that
the "local"/"national"

distinction, see Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12

How.) 299, 319 (1851), limiting state regulation of commerce in the absence of
Congressional legislation, is not a limit on the power of Congress. Heart of Atlanta

Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964), and Katzenbach v. McClung,
379 U.S. 294, 301-02 (1964). Justice Rutledge's third theme was that where Congress
and the states act in coordination, their actions are not limited by Constitutional
provisions apportioning powers between Congress and the states, but only by provisions limiting governmental action entirely. 328 U.S. at 433, 434-36 n.47, 439; cf.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-37 (1952) (J. Jackson,
concurring):
When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of
Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses
in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate .... If his act is held
unconstitutional under these circumstances, it usually means that the Federal
Government as an undivided whole lacks power.
Id. at 635-37.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 14-22, 67.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 23-49.
163. See TRINE, supra note 3, at 208, 210.
164. Id. at 115, 129; see Norman Vieira, Roe and Doe: Substantive Due Process
and the Right of Abortion, 25 HASTNocs L.J. 867, 875 (1974); cf. Erwin Chemerinsky,
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seen, involves more effective contraception, better maternity and
postnatal services and benefits, and an adjustment of our attitudes
65
about the debate.
III.

COMPROMISE

Tribe tells why a compromise on abortion is needed. He tells
how a compromise is to be reached. However, he does not offer any
new compromise to the abortion dilemma. This section, after reviewing Tribe's views on those topics, explores possible compromises
suggested by the Constitution.
A.

TRIBE ON COMPROMISE

Tribe says that a compromise on abortion is needed, because the
life of the fetus conflicts with the liberty of the pregnant woman.'"6
If abortions are allowed, countless babies will not be born. 67 If legal
abortions are not allowed, women will suffer unique physical, emotional, and psychological consequences from their pregnancies, resulting either in unwanted babies'6 8 or in illegal abortions with possible
disfigurement or death to women.' 69 The conflict between the life of
70
the fetus and the liberty of the pregnant woman is bitter and divisive,
7
public and private.' '
Tribe suggests why both pro-life and pro-choice advocates might
seek compromise, notwithstanding their conflicting positions. Each
side could easily be in a worse position than it now is. The Supreme
' 72
Court's Webster decision has put abortion rights "up for grabs.'
On the other hand, the reaction to Webster has been a backlash
favoring pro-choice in legislative 73 and executive offices, 74 in public
Rationalizing the Abortion Debate: Legal Rhetoric and the Abortion Controversy,
31 BUFF. L. REV. 107, 142 (1982) (arguing that the woman should have the right at
any time to remove the fetus from her body, but the state may impose standards to
assure fetal survival).
165. See supra text accompanying notes 68-70.
166. TRIBE, supra note 3, at 3, 8.
167. Id. at 5. About 1,600,000 abortions are now performed in the United States
each year. Id. at 227.
168. Id. at 103-04.
169. Id. at 5, 35, 41. About 1 million illegal abortions were performed in the
United States each year before Roe v. Wade. Id. at 137.
170. Id. at 7.
171. See supra notes 4-9 and accompanying text.
172. TsmE, supra note 3, at 6.
173. Id. at 179-84, 190. But see id. at 192.
174. Id. at 185-91.
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Politi-

cally, compromise has several advantages. Most pro-life and prochoice advocates are interested in other issues, 177 e.g., the pro-life
Roman Catholic Church is interested in "social justice issues," such
as equal rights for racial minorities and housing and other welfare

rights;'7 s pro-choice feminists are interested in political and economic
freedom for women. 79 Resolving the abortion dilemma would permit
both camps to use their "political chips" (energy and resources) on

80
those other issues, instead of spending them on the abortion conflict.
Also, compromise or moderate positions are more popular with the
public.'

Tribe describes how a compromise is to be reached. In a repre-

sentative democracy, such as ours, solutions are reached through the

political process, 8 "' including legislative, executive, and judicial
determinations 3 and citizen voting and public discussion. '8

Tribe does not offer any new compromise to the abortion di-

lemma,8 5 although he is an eminent Constitutional scholar, I" although
his book is about Constitutional law, 8 7 and although the Constitution

does reflect compromises, generally,' and, particularly, on such
divisive issues as slavery'8 9 and Prohibition (of alcoholic beverages).1' 9
B. THE CONSTITUTION AS A SOURCE OF COMPROMISING POSITIONS

This subsection and the next one explore possible compromises
to the abortion dilemma, suggested by the Constitution, 9 which may

be considered by participants in the political process.

175. Id. at 182.
176. Id. at 184-85.
177. But cf. id. at 182 (discussing "single issue" politics of both pro-life and
pro-choice groups in supporting candidates for public office).
178. Id. at 159-60.
179. Id. at 44-45, 195.
180. Id. at 194-95.
181. See id. at 192-93.
182. See id. at 196, 240.
183. Id. at 80.
184. Id. at 240.
185. See supra notes 160-66 and accompanying text.
186. The dust jacket to Tribe's book describes him as the Tyler Professor of
Constitutional Law at Harvard Law School, the author of a treatise on American
Constitutional law (considered the leading modern work on the subject), a premier
Supreme Court litigator, and a most influential Constitutional lawyer.
187. TRIBE, supra note 3, at 7.
188. LAURENCE H. TRImE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW

1 (2d ed. 1988).

189. See TRIBE, supra note 3, at 116, 119.
190. See id. at 116, 220.
191. Of course, additional compromises or approaches are suggested by other

1992:631

ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES

Interestingly, the Constitution, as a source of compromising
positions, is both more and less helpful than it first appears. The
Prohibition issue illustrates how the Constitution may be more helpful
in that respect than it first appears. The slavery issue illustrates how
the Constitution may be less helpful than it first appears.
Initially, the Constitution's treatment of the Prohibition issue
appears to offer little or no compromise - the Eighteenth Amendment
prohibited alcoholic beverages and its repealer, the Twenty-First
Amendment, permits alcoholic beverages.
(than Constitutional) law, logic, science, and experience. Regarding other law, Tribe
briefly explores possible analogies between abortion and other legal concepts. First,
in discussing whether a fetus should be considered a "person" for purposes of the
Constitution, Tribe examines and rejects the idea that under criminal law abortion
should be considered murder. Id. at 115, 121-22. Second, in the same context of
whether a fetus should be considered a "person," Tribe considers and rejects the
application of a "best interests" standard for protecting a fetus from an unhealthy
uterine environment. Id. at 124-25. Third, he investigates and rejects the idea that a
woman would be justified in having an abortion only by the legal principle of selfdefense, as where her life is threatened. Id. at 121-22, 157. Fourth, Tribe analyzes
and rejects a possible legal duty of a woman to rescue her fetus by refraining from
having an abortion. Id. at 130-35. Fifth, Tribe mentions, without applying them to
the abortion context, the legal concepts of conscription of persons to serve in the
military and commandeering by law enforcement officers of persons to assist in
emergencies. Id. at 113. Other legal approaches might be considered in connection
with abortion. Should a woman have a duty to support her fetus, just as a parent
has a duty to support a child? See, e.g., UNrF. PARENTAGE ACT, 9B U.L.A. 287
(1987), and UNiF. ACT ON PATERNITY, id. at 347. Or should the duty of support not
begin before birth, just as the duty ends with majority? Should abortion be permitted
only for certain reasons, just as divorce once was? See UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
ACT, 9A U.L.A. 147 (1987) (Prefatory Note). Or, should abortion be permitted
without the necessity for giving a reason, just as divorce now generally is? See id.
Should all persons with an interest (woman, fetus, putative father, other putative
relatives, the doctor, the hospital, the government, etc.) be permitted or even required
to join in making the abortion decision, just as all persons with an interest are
permitted or required to join as parties to a civil action? See FED. R. CwV. P. 19, 20.
Should a guardian be appointed to represent the fetus in participating in the abortion
decision, just as guardians may be appointed to represent infants in civil actions?
See FED. R. CIV. P. 17(c).
Regarding logic, Tribe compares abortion with earlier measures, such as contraception, generally permitted and with later measures, such as infanticide, almost
universally prohibited. TRME, supra note 3, at 122-23, 224.
Regarding science, Tribe briefly explores concepts from the sciences of biology,
genetics, anatomy, physiology, and neurology dealing with when a person's life begins
and what a "person" is. Id. at 116-20.
Regarding experience, Tribe considers the general medical standard of therapeutic
or medically necessary, but rejects it in the abortion context either as too restrictive
of abortion rights, id. at 151-599, or as too malleable in a doctor's discretion. Id. at
35.
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However, both amendments contain a number of compromises,
including the following. The Eighteenth Amendment's effective date
was one year from its ratification; it was not immediately effective. 92
Only certain activities respecting intoxicating liquors - manufacture,
sale, transportation, importation, and exportation - were prohibited;
other activities, such as consumption, gift, and storage, were not
explicitly affected. 93 Only activities relating to the use of intoxicating
liquors for beverage purposes were prohibited; no explicit mention
was made of industrial, medicinal, or, perhaps, sacramental purposes.'9 Legislative enforcement power was concurrent in Congress
and the states, not exclusively in one or the other. 95
Generally, the Twenty-First Amendment left the option about
whether to regulate intoxicating liquors to the states; the amendment
did not abandon such regulation.' 96 Again, only certain activities transportation, importation, or possession for delivery or use, not all
activities - were covered.' 97
Initially, the Constitution's treatment of the slavery issue appears
helpful, as a source of compromising positions. The nine provisions
of the original Constitution, implicitly recognizing slavery, 98 reflected
a number of compromises, including the following. Congressional
representatives and direct taxes were apportioned among the states,
not by ignoring slaves and not by calculating them like free persons
were calculated, but by calculating each slave as three-fifths of a
person.'" Congress was not barred from prohibiting the importation
of slaves, but was barred from prohibiting that importation prior to
1808." Congress could tax the importation of slaves, but the tax
could not be more than $10 apiece.20' While states were allowed the
192. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, sec. 1.

193. Id.
194. Id. But cf. Act of Oct. 28, 1919, National Prohibition (Volstead) Act, ch.
85, tit. II, sec. 3, 41 Stat. 308-09 (repealed 1935) (sacramental wine excluded from

Prohibition).

195. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, sec. 2.
196. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, sec.2.

197. Id.

198. William M. Wiecek, "The Blessings of Liberty": Slavery in the American

Constitutional Order, in SLAVERY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 32 (R. Goldwin & A.

Kaufman eds., 1988).

199. U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 2, c. 3; cf. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.)

393 (1857) (stating that a slave is not a "person," but is the property of the slave's
owner).
200. U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 9, c. 1.

201. Id.
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option of permitting slavery or not, a slave could not become free by
20 2
escaping to a free state, and had to be returned to the slave's owner.
Also, the Civil War Amendments, abolishing slavery, 20 3 reflect a
number of compromises. Slavery and involuntary servitude were not
absolutely prohibited; an exception was made for punishment for
crime after due conviction. 204 States were not required to permit exmade punishable by
slaves to vote, 205 but denial of the vote was
206
Congress.
in
representation
state's
a
reducing
However, the Constitutional provisions regarding slavery are less
helpful for compromise on abortion than first appears. As Tribe
suggests, both a fetus and a (pregnant) woman may be analogized to
a slave. 207 A fetus has been described by some pro-choice advocates
as just part of the pregnant woman's body, 20 i.e., as something akin
to property of the female. On the other hand, females historically
were often treated by law as property; 2°9 recognition of abortion rights
may be necessary for their equality with males. 210 In other words,
while the slavery provisions may reflect a number of compromises,
pro-life and pro-choice advocates are likely to disagree about who
may properly use the slavery analogy.
C.

COMPROMISING POSITIONS

Finally, we consider possible compromises to the abortion dilemma, suggested by provisions of the Constitution for resolving other
problems. Those possible compromises to the abortion dilemma reflect
three principles of selection: (1) new, generally untried,2 1 ' possibilities;
202. U.S. CONST. art. IV, sec. 2, cl. 3.
203. U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, XV.

204. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, sec. 1.
205. But see U.S. CONST. amend. XV, sec. 1.
206. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, sec. 2.
207. TRIE, supra note 3, at 119.
208. Id. at 102, 137.
209. Id. at 119.
210. Id. at 193-94.
211. Many other compromises, suggested by the Constitution, are described in
Tribe's book. First, Tribe points out the position of Father Robert F. Drinan that,
at least in the early stages of pregnancy, abortion is not the law's business. See
TRE, supra note 3, at 46-47. That approach is hinted at by the First Amendment,
which provides that "Congress shall make no law" on certain matters (establishing
a religion, prohibiting free exercise of religion, or abridging freedoms of speech and
press and the rights to assemble peaceably and to petition the government). The
"hands-off" approach is also suggested by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments,
reserving certain rights and powers to the people, and by the Eleventh Amendment,
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(2) respect for both pro-life and pro-choice viewpoints; and (3)
22
perceived feasibility1

withdrawing certain matters (suit by a citizen against a state) from the power of the
federal courts. Other commentators have also noted a distinction between law and
morals or between public morals and private morals. See, e.g., Michael J. Perry,
Abortion, the Public Morals, and the Police Power: The Ethical Function of
Substantive Due Process, 23 UCLA L. REv. 689, 726-27 (1976).
Second, Tribe calls attention to the holding of Roe v. Wade that, although
pregnant women have a Constitutional right of privacy, which includes some right
to abortion, TRIBE, supra note 3, at 10-12, the fetus is not a "person" entitled to
Constitutional rights. Id. at 115; see also Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv. in
which the Supreme Court largely deferred the issue of the Constitutionality of the
preamble to a Missouri statute, declaring that the life of each human being begins at
conception. TRIBE, supra note 3, at 20, 126. That definitional approach reflects
Supreme Court interpretations of the term "person" in the Fourteenth Amendment,
e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (describing an alien as a "person"),
Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886) (describing a
corporation as a "person"), and see Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977)
(describing a juvenile as a "person"). But, query, should a fetus be treated "as if"
it were a person, because of its gradual development from a sperm and ovum at
conception to a "person" at birth, or because it would develop into a "person" but
for an abortion? See TRBE, supra note 3, at 224; cf. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII
(noting that the District of Columbia is entitled to appoint presidential electors "as
if" it were a state) and U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI (noting the voting age, typically
21 before then, was set at 18).
Third, Tribe remarks on the woman's right to self-determination, TRIBE, supra
note 3, at 208, or autonomy, id. at 63, 113, 132, 135, 137-38, in making the abortion
decision. That approach is suggested by Article I, Section 5, Clauses 1 & 2, which
make each house of Congress responsible for its own affairs (elections, returns, and
qualifications of members, rules of proceedings, and punishment and expulsion of
members). But, query, should a fetus, i.e., a fetus by a representative acting on its
behalf, also have a right to self-determination?
Fourth, Tribe mentions the proposal of Senator Orrin Hatch that the Constitution
be amended to permit the states to regulate abortion. TRIBE, supra note 3, at 16163. Tribe also notes that the practical effect of Webster has been to return a
substantial amount of abortion regulation to the states. Id. at 21-24, 197. That
approach is suggested by the Twenty-First Amendment which, as we have seen, see
supra text accompanying note 197, permits local option as to a subject (regulation
of alcoholic beverages).
Fifth, Tribe indicates that Roe recognized that the states could prohibit abortion
in the third trimester, except where it was necessary to preserve the life or health of
the pregnant woman. TRIBE, supra note 3, at 12. He also notes that the annual Hyde
Amendment, restricting federal funding of abortion under Medicaid, would allow
abortion except, for example, where the life or health of the pregnant woman was
endangered or where the pregnancy resulted from rape or incest. Id. at 156. Those
approaches are suggested by the Thirteenth Amendment, which prohibits certain
activities (slavery and involuntary servitude), with an exception (punishment for crime
after due conviction). Conversely, Tribe suggests that even in the first trimester Roe
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1. General Standard. The Constitution provides a number of
general standards. 2 3 The Preamble refers to justice and general welfare
makes abortions generally available, but permits government to prohibit the performance of abortions by persons other than licensed physicians. TRIBE, supra note 3, at
11. Tribe also writes that abortions performed for certain purposes, such as for sale
of fetal tissue for medical experiments or as a source of transplants, may be
prohibited. Id. at 133. Also, Tribe notes that abortions performed for certain other
purposes, such as for maintaining the beauty of the female figure, id. at 55, for sex
selection, id. at 137, 204-05, or for birth control, id. at 204-05, may be considered
immoral. Those approaches are suggested by Article 1, Section 9, Clause 2, which
establishes a privilege (habeas corpus), with certain exceptions (when required by
public safety in cases of rebellion or invasion) and by the Fourth Amendment right
(security of persons, houses, papers, and effects against searches and seizures), with
certain exceptions (reasonableness or warrant issued upon probable cause, supported
by oath or affidavit, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized).
Sixth, Tribe indicates that some states have imposed waiting periods on women
seeking abortions, TRIBE, supra note 3, at 14, 18, 144, 192, 203-04, and that, although
the Supreme Court struck down waiting periods on two occasions, id. at 14, 18,
waiting periods may be permitted after Webster, id. at 197. The waiting period
approach is suggested by provisions such as Article I, Section 7, Clause 2, which
prescribes a period of ten days after which action may be taken (effectiveness of a
bill presented to the President, but neither approved by him nor returned to the
Congress).
Seventh, Tribe points out that Roe recognized the age of the fetus as important
for the types of abortion restrictions that government may impose - only licensure
of the physician in the first trimester, regulations for protecting the pregnant woman's
health in the second and third trimesters, and prohibition of abortion in the third
trimester,.unless an abortion is necessary to protect the life or health of the woman.
TRIBE, supra note 3, at 11-12. Tribe also considers, and rejects, the possibilities that
a fetus (or embryo) be considered a "person" for Constitutional purposes at various
stages - at the "moment" of conception, id. at 115-25, or at various points during
the 24 hour "process" of conception, id. at 123, when the fertilized ovum is implanted
in the wall of the uterus, id. at 122-23, when the fetus begins to display higher-level
neurological activity, id. at 120, when the fetus begins to resemble a baby, id. at
117, at quickening, see id. at 28, or at viability, see id. at 122-23 - before birth, see
id. at 120-21. That approach is suggested by provisions of the Constitution which
establish minimum ages for certain purposes, e.g., 25 years for Representative, U.S.
CoN sT. art. I, sec. 2, cl. 2; 30 years for Senator, U.S. CoNsT. art. I, sec. 3, cl. 3; 35
years for President, U.S. CONST. art. II, sec. I, cl. 4; 18 years for voting, U.S.
CONST. amend. XXVI.
Eighth, Tribe calls attention to the Georgia statute struck down in Doe v. Bolton,
410 U.S. 179 (1973), that required the written opinions of the physician performing
an abortion and two other physicians that the abortion was necessary, as well as the
advance approval of the abortion committee of the hospital where the abortion was
to be performed. TRIBE, supra note 3, at 42, 140. That approach is suggested by
Article II, Section 1 which provides that a government official (the President) may
require the written opinion of another official (the principal officer of any executive
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(as purposes of establishing the Constitution). Article I, Section 8
mentions the general welfare (as a purpose of taxation). Article III,
Section 1 establishes a standard of good behavior (for judges holding
office). The Fourth Amendment provides a standard of reasonableness
(against which searches and seizures are to be measured). Should a
pregnant woman be required to prove that a proposed abortion would
be just, consistent with the general welfare, good behavior, or reasonable before she may have an abortion? Or should an abortion be
permitted, unless another person can show that it is not just, consistent
with the general welfare, good behavior, or reasonable? 214
2. Hierarchy. The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments protect life, liberty, and property. Do those
clauses establish a hierarchy of values - life being the most important,
department) upon certain subjects (the duties of the office).
Ninth, Tribe remarks on the government's efforts to require the consent of
persons, other than the pregnant woman, to abortion. TRIBE, supra note 3, at 14,
198-99. A requirement that the woman's spouse consent to abortion was struck down
in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). TRIBE, supra note 3, at 14,
134, 198. However, a requirement of parental consent to a minor pregnant female's
abortion, where a judicial bypass procedure was included, was upheld in City of
Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983). TRIBE, supra
note 3, at 14. That approach is suggested by a number of checks-and-balances in the
Constitution, such as Article I, Section 7, Clauses 2 & 3 (presentment of legislation
to the President) and Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 (advice and consent of the Senate
to President's treaties and appointments). Cf. U.S. CONST. art. IV, sec. 3, cl. 1 (no
new states may be formed from existing states without their consent).
Tenth, Tribe mentions that government has made efforts to require advance
notice of abortion to other persons, in particular, to the parents of a minor pregnant
female. TRIBE, supra note 3, at 199-203. Since Tribe's book was published, parental
notice requirements, where a judicial bypass procedure was provided, have been
upheld in Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990), and Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for
Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990). The advance notice approach is suggested by
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments, which have been
interpreted to require a state to provide notice before it deprives a person of life,
liberty, or property. See, e.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339
U.S. 306 (1950); cf. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (in all criminal prosecutions the accused
shall enjoy the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation).
212. The perception of feasibility, of course, is mine. In the final analysis,
compromise is reached through the political process, see supra notes 183-85 and
accompanying text, which operates in ways difficult to predict.
213. Cf. TRIBE, supra note 3, at 71-75 (criticizing European use of grounds for
abortion, such as "emergency," as being so broad as to offer no meaningful standard,
leading to disrespect for law, disregard for fetal life, and discriminatory exercise of
discretion).
214. Cf. id. at 155-56 (Senator Edward Brooke's proposed "medical necessity"
standard for Medicaid-funded abortions).
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liberty being the next most important, and property being the least
important of the three? 215 Is the fetus entitled to claim the rights of a
"person" under the Constitution? 2 6 If so, should the life of the fetus

be superior to the liberty of the pregnant woman, unless her life is
also at risk? Or, if a fetus is not a "person" for purposes of the
Constitution, 2 7 should both the life and liberty of the pregnant woman
outrank the life of the fetus? Are Constitutional rights of the fetus
ordinarily even implicated by the action of a pregnant woman and
218
her doctor, typically not involving "state action"?
3. Prohibited/PermittedActivities. As we have seen, both the
Eighteenth and Twenty-first Amendments cover only certain activities
relating to the subject matter (first, Prohibition and, then, local
option, regarding regulation of alcoholic beverages). 21 9 Should only
contraception and forced birth of a fetus, not abortion 220 or infanticide, 22' be permitted? Or should abortion, as well as contraception,
be permitted?
4. Fractional Person. As we have seen, one of the slavery
provisions of the original Constitution calculated one class of beings
(slaves) as fractional persons for certain purposes (apportionment of
222
representatives in Congress and of direct taxes among the states).
Should fetuses be calculated as fractional persons for purposes of the
22 4
3
Constitution, e.g., Due Process Clause, 22 Equal Protection Clause,

215. Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803) (the Supremacy
Clause of Article VI, Clause 2, mentioning the Constitution before the laws of the
United States, supports the superiority of the Constitution over acts of Congress).
216. See supra note 116. If the fetus is entitled to claim the rights of a "person"
for purposes of the Constitution, who may assert those rights for the fetus, in light
of its incapacity?
217. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 156-59.
218. But cf. supra note 108 (explaining Tribe's assumption that government
inaction, in failing to limit abortions, might constitute "state action").
219. See supra text accompanying notes 193-94, 197.
220. See TRIE, supra note 3, at 15, 98-99, 136-38, 223-25.
221. See id. at 224.
222. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
223. But see TRBE, supra note 3, at 115-25 (the fetus is not a "person" protected
by the Due Process Clause. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 100, 106, 122-23
(privacy rights of women, parents of minors, and men protected by the Due Process
Clause).
224. But see TRBE, supra note 3, at 115-25 (the fetus is not a "person" protected
by the Equal Protection Clause). Cf. supra notes 101, 107, 127 and accompanying

text (rights of women and men to equal protection of the laws in the abortion
context).
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and Just Compensation Clause,225 to the extent that the fetuses have
existed for a portion of a full term of pregnancy?2 26 Thus, a onemonth old fetus might be considered one-ninth of a person, a twomonth old fetus might be considered two-ninths of a person, etc. If
the fetus has Constitutional rights, who may assert those rights for
the fetus, in light of its incapacity? How should the fractional rights
of fetuses be aggregated with compatible rights of other persons and
accommodated with conflicting rights of still other persons?
5. Deadline. As we have seen, another one of the slavery
provisions of the original Constitution barred Congress from taking
certain action (prohibiting the importation of slaves) before a specified
date (1808).227 Should abortion be prohibited on and after a specified
date, encouraging pro-choice advocates to educate the population in
contraception and to see to the availability of birth control technology
by that date? Or, should abortion be readily permitted on and after
a specified date, encouraging pro-life advocates to educate the population in sexual morality and the value of life by that date?
6. Tax. As we have seen, a slavery provision of the original
Constitution permitted Congress to tax a transaction (the importation
of slaves), but limited that tax (to not more than $10 each slave). 228
Should the government tax abortions, earmarking revenues for funding education in contraception, sexual morality, and the value of life
and for funding fetal and maternity care and services?
7. Oath. Article II, Section 1, Clause 7 specifies the oath or
affirmation to be taken by the President. Article VI, Clause 3 requires
Senators, Representatives, state legislators, and other federal and state
executive and judicial officials to take an oath or affirmation to
support the Constitution. Should a pregnant woman and her physician
be required to take oath or affirmation that an abortion would be
consistent with some general standard? 229 Or should a pregnant woman
and her physician be required to take oath that an abortion would
fall within a permitted exception to a general rule that abortions are
225. See supra note 108 (speculating on the possibility that the fetus is protected
by the Just Compensation Clause). Cf. supra notes 103, 108 and accompanying text
(speculating on the right of women to just compensation for takings of property by
limiting abortion rights).
226. Cf. supra note 116 (speculating on whether the fetus might be entitled to a
full claim of Constitutional rights, because of its gradual development from a sperm
and ovum at conception to a "person" at birth, or because it would develop into a
"person" but for an abortion).

227. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
228. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.

229. See supra notes 213-14 and accompanying text.
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prohibited or would not fall within a prohibited exception to a general
230
rule that abortions are permitted?

One Person, One Vote. The Constitution, expressly and as

8.

construed, provides a rule of one person, one vote in a variety of

contexts. Article I, Section 3, Clause I expressly provides that each
Senator shall have one vote. Article I, Section 2, Clause 1 was

construed in Wesberry v. Sander3 to require that representatives in
Congress be elected by districts of equal population. The Equal

Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was similarly construed in Reynolds v. Sims 232 to require the same rule for elections of
state legislators. Should each person affected by the abortion decision

have an equal vote in the decision? Who should be considered as
participants for that purpose - the pregnant woman, her physician,

the putative father, the fetus, parents of a minor pregnant female,
etc? If the fetus is considered as a participant, who may vote on its
behalf? Should voting be by simple majority or by some super
majority? 233 If voting is by a simple majority, how should a tie be
23 4

broken?
9.

Separation of Powers. In order to preclude tyranny, 235 the

Constitution generally separates the legislative, executive, and judicial
functions into three branches. 23 6 In particular, the Constitution prohibits one branch of government from making law, executing law,
and adjudging law in the same case. 237 Should the proposing, deciding,
and performing of an abortion be allocated among different persons
interested in the matter? 238 Or is the matter one for the self-determination of the pregnant woman 23 9 in consultation with her physician?
230. See supra notes 193-94 and accompanying text.
231. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
232. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
233. A number of Constitutional provisions require a super-majority, such as
two-thirds, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 3, cl. 6 (Senate conviction in cases of
impeachment), U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 7, cl. 2 (Congress passage of a bill after a
Presidential veto), and U.S. CONST. art. II, sec. 2, cl. 2 (Senate advice and consent
to treaties).
234. Cf. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, sec. 3, cl. 4 (the Vice President, who is President
of the Senate, has no vote there, except in case of a tie).
235. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 313 (James Madison) (Modern Library College
ed. 1937).
236. See U.S. CONST. art. I (legislative), art. II (executive), and art. III (judicial).
237. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 9, cl. 3, (prohibiting bills of attainder).
238. Query, who should be considered as interested? Cf. supra text accompanying notes 231-34 (examining one person, one vote).
239. See supra note 210.
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10. Conflict of Interest. The Constitution has a number of
provisions prohibiting conflicts of interest. E.g., Article I, Section 6,
Clause 2 prohibits a person holding an office under the United States
from being a member of either house of Congress, and Article 1,
Section 9, Clause 8 prohibits a person holding an office under the
United States from holding office in a foreign state. May the conflict
of interest concept be usefully adapted to the abortion context, which
involves a variety of family (and other) relationships and interests?
E.g., may a pregnant woman, whose liberty is at stake, be barred
from making an abortion decision regarding a fetus, whose life is at
stake, without disclosure to some neutral decision-maker and24 a determination that the proposed abortion is fair and reasonable? 0
11. Notice and Opportunity to be Heard. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments provide that government may not deprive a
person of life, liberty, or property without due process. The Supreme
Court has interpreted those provisions as ordinarily requiring notice
and opportunity to be heard before the deprivation.24 Should each
person involved in the abortion decision 242 have notice and an opportunity to be heard before the abortion is performed? If so, what are
2
the requisites of the notice?2 3 What are the requisites of the hearing? "
24
5
In particular, does the fetus have a right to representation and to
an impartial decision-maker? 2 "
12. Jury. The Seventh Amendment provides for a trial of certain
civil suits247 by representatives of the community under the supervision
of a judge. May a jury, formal or informal, be useful in resolving
248
abortion disputes? If so, what standards would the jury apply?
What remedies would it grant - a determination of whether a
240. Cf. MODEL BUSINESS CoRP. ACT §§ 8.60-8.63 (1991) (discussing director's
conflicting interest transaction).
241. See, e.g., Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
242. Query, who should be considered as involved? Cf. supra text accompanying
notes 232-33 (examining one person, one vote).
243. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
244. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).

245. Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 17(c) (guardians may be appointed to represent infants
in civil litigation); U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI (right to assistance of counsel in criminal
cases).

246. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986) (civil case) and

Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972) (criminal case); cf. supra text

accompanying note 240 (conflict of interest).
247. Cf. U.S. CONST. art. Il, sec. 2, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. amend. VI (jury in
criminal cases).

248. See supra notes 213-14 and accompanying text.
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proposed abortion would be proper and under what circumstances it
might be performed, or traditional legal relief (damages) after an
improper abortion?
13. Equity. Article III, Section 2, describing the judicial power,
authorizes the judiciary to hear cases in equity, as well as cases at
law. Is the discretionary and flexible justice, traditionally dispensed
by equity, better suited than the common law jury to resolving
abortion disputes? If so, what standards would equity apply standards designed specifically for abortion disputes, u 9 general standards, 250 or general equitable discretion, considering all the circum25
stances of a case in light of the principles and maxims of equity? '
What remedies would equity grant - a determination of whether an
abortion would be proper and under what circumstances it might be
performed, traditional equitable relief (an injunction) against an
improper, proposed abortion, or traditional legal relief (damages)
after an improper abortion?
CONCLUSION

This review has emphasized the seemingly intractable nature of
the abortion dilemma between the life of the fetus and the liberty of
the pregnant woman. This review has examined and evaluated Laurence Tribe's attempts to reach a satisfactory compromise to the
dilemma. Finally, this review has developed other compromising
positions, using the Constitution as a source-book. These new possibilities may both stimulate the political dialogue about abortion and
produce an appreciation for our Constitution as a product of compromise.

249. Cf. supra notes 138-43 and accompanying text (disapproved reasons for
abortion).
250. See supra notes 213-14 and accompanying text.
251. See generally 1 JOHN POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 363 (3d ed. 1905).

